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ABSTRACT
The challenge of isolating the impact of Europeanisation is an
arduous one, which explains why analysts have preferred complex
rather than parsimonious explanations of this phenomenon. Given
this predilection among scholars, it is surprising that the concept
of regime complexity has not been meaningfully applied in the
Europeanisation literature. This article lays some initial
groundwork for assessing whether regime complexity has
weakened or reinforced the impact of Europeanisation, with
reference speciﬁcally to French aid. This article begins by
highlighting the limited impact of Europeanisation on French
assistance in the early decades of European integration. Next, it
demonstrates how the climate became more propitious as from
the late 1990s following domestic reforms, increased European
Union (EU) pressures and the emergence of an aid regime
complex. Drawing on elite interviews, it shows how France has
become more receptive to Europeanisation, while also using
regime complexity to reframe EU norms. Finally, it explains why
and how France has resisted Europeanisation and explores the
wider signiﬁcance of the French case and of regime complexity.
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Introduction
The concept of Europeanisation cuts across debates between intergovernmentalists and
liberal institutionalists and between rationalists and constructivists. Yet it has given rise to
its own debates. One of these, on the nature of Europeanisation, has been widely rehearsed
(e.g. Harmsen & Wilson, 2000) and need not be revisited here. Another, more central to this
study, revolves around the challenges of disentangling the effect of Europeanisation – that
is, ‘the impact of the EU on itsmember states’ domestic spheres’ (Börzel & Risse, 2006, p. 485)
– from that of domestic variables and internationalisation. The task of isolating the ‘net
EU impact’ (Levi-Faur, 2004) is an arduous one, which helps explain why scholars have pre-
ferred complex rather than parsimonius explanations (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009, p. 526).
Given this predilection, it is surprising that the concept of ‘international regime complexity’
has yet to be meaningfully employed in the Europeanisation literature.1
The regime concept is already familiar to International Relations scholars and refers to
‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which
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actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner, 1983,
p. 1). Regime theory generally emphasises the role of a single institutional point bringing
states together by reducing the transaction costs of rule-creation and increasing the repu-
tational damage of rule-breaking (Orsini et al., 2013, p. 29). However, a more recent con-
tribution to thinking involves ‘regime complexity’, that is, ‘nested, partially overlapping,
and parallel international regimes that are not hierarchically ordered’ (Alter & Meunier,
2009, p. 13).2 Regime complexes are marked by more than one institutional focal point
and exhibit divergence regarding the norms governing them.
This article lays some initial groundwork for assessing whether regime complexity has
reinforced or weakened the impact of Europeanisation, with reference speciﬁcally to the
ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA) structures and policies of a leading European
Union (EU) member state (MS), France. In so doing, it provides an original take on
regime complexity as a tool for identifying the effect of EU pressures.3 It also contributes
to the debate on whether regime complexes increase or reduce pressures for norm com-
pliance (Drezner, 2009). Finally, it brings MSs back into the study of EU development policy
and sheds light on the French aid programme, which is a hard case for testing Europea-
nisation (Claeys, 2004), given that France was the original architect behind the common
European development policy and has retained the capacity and willingness to resist
EU pressures on its bilateral aid (Balleix, 2010).
In order to make this contribution, this article examines the limited Europeanisation of
France’s aid polity (or structures) and policy over the early decades of European inte-
gration. Next, it identiﬁes factors that have facilitated Europeanisation since France’s aid
reforms in the late 1990s, focusing on declining French inﬂuence, enhanced EU pressures
and the emerging aid regime complex. Drawing upon 18 elite interviews in Paris, London
and Brussels, this study then assesses the EU’s enhanced, but still limited, impact on
French ODA. It explains why and how France has resisted Europeanisation by drawing
on veto players and strategic ambiguities created by regime complexity. It concludes by
exploring the wider signiﬁcance of the French case and of regime complexity.
Research parameters
Before proceeding, it is worth noting, ﬁrst of all this analysis does not assume that Eur-
opeanisation should take place or that it is being systematically pursued by Brussels.
Second, it does not enter into the debate between rationalists, who see MSs acting out
of a logic of consequentiality, and constructivists, who emphasise a logic of appropriate-
ness (March & Olsen, 1998). Instead, both perspectives are drawn on, even if greater
emphasis is placed on France’s rational pursuit of the ‘national interest’. Third, while the
focus here is primarily on top-down Europeanisation, it is impossible, in the case of estab-
lished MSs such as France, to disregard instances of uploading (France→ EU) and cross-
loading (e.g. France plus MS→ EU). Indeed, the choice of a regime complexity
perspective actually lends itself to a multi-dimensional take on Europeanisation.
Fourth, the emphasis is on the EU’s effect on France’s aid policies and polity, since these
are areas where there is evidence of Europeanisation. The impact on the third ‘p’– the poli-
tics of French policy-making – is harder to demonstrate. To illustrate, while the French
business lobby has adapted its lobbying to secure lucrative EU aid contracts, with 30
French businesses now having ofﬁces in Brussels, it continues to prioritise France’s
2 G. D. CUMMING
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
7:0
9 0
6 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
export credit guarantee department as a funding source (Karpeles, 2011, p. 8). Equally,
while French non-governmental organisation (NGO) platforms have beneﬁted from EU
funding, they have continued to prioritise their own development agenda and have
kept up that their criticism of EU subsidies and dumping (CRID, 2003). Signiﬁcantly too,
‘the level of Europeanisation of the French Parliament still appears [… ] modest [… ].
Outside of the small club of EU Committee members, French MPs [… ] hardly ever deal
with Community matters’ (Rozenberg, 2011, p. 16).
Finally, this research does not set out to capture the myriad of norms, forums and strat-
egies associated with the aid regime complex. Instead, the focus is limited to the conse-
quences of this complex: has it reinforced pressures for Europeanisation or helped
France avoid EU-backed norms by drawing upon the following strategies: ‘forum shop-
ping’ (selecting or creating an amenable alternative venue), ‘norm-stretching’ or ‘shifting’
(bending rules or reframing norms in advantageous ways) and ‘regime-shifting’ (altering
the premise on which a regime is based)?
The impact of the traditional aid regime over the early post-colonial decades has been
examined by scholars, such as Lumsdaine (1993), who show how this was dominated by a
hegemon, the US-backed World Bank, with its inﬂuential development nostra, and sup-
ported by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD)/Development
Assistance Committee (DAC), with its peer reviews, and the United Nations (UN), with its
aid volume targets. The European Commission assumed a norm-taker or ‘cash dispenser’
role (Petit, 2013, p. 175), while around twenty DAC state donors adhered informally to col-
lective regime norms. The transition to a regime complex began in the mid-1990s as more
diverse donors entered the fold. These included philanthropic organisations, such as the
Gates Foundation (created in 1997), countless Southern and Northern civil society organ-
isations (CSOs), multinational companies, diasporas, former aid recipients like the central
and east European states, the Gulf states and other emerging powers, such as the BRICs
(Brazil, Russia, India and China).
Early traces of Europeanisation
Space constraints do not allow for a detailed chronological account of the Europeanisation
of French aid over several decades (1957–97). Instead, this section provides a thematic
overview of areas where European pressures might be expected to have impacted on
French aid structures and policies (speciﬁcally on ODA volumes, quality and coherence).
To begin with EU pressures on French aid structures, the emergence of a common
development policy from the outset of the European project was bound to elicit an insti-
tutional response from the French government. As well as establishing a permanent rep-
resentation in Brussels, France created, in 1963, a system of information exchange
between the French Cooperation Ministry and the European Commission. It also centra-
lised responsibility for ministerial dealings with Europe in the hands of the Secrétariat
général du comité interministériel (SGCI), a unit based in the Prime Minister’s ofﬁce
(Harmsen, 1999, p. 88). These structural adaptations were, however, minor compared to
France’s impact on Europe’s aid architecture. In this context, Claeys (2004, p. 113) contends
that the European Commission was originally built ‘to French administrative speciﬁca-
tions’, while Dimier (2013, p. 32) argues that the European Development Fund (EDF) –
which ﬁnances Europe’s aid and trade conventions with former colonies – ‘reproduced
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the mechanisms of the Fund for Economic and Social Development, which France set up in
1946’ for its bilateral assistance programme. Equally, Bué (2011, p. 86) suggests that the
European Commission’s Directorate-General for Development was ‘an institutional ana-
chronism’, concentrating on France’s ex-colonies.
Turning to aid policy, here the EU’s inﬂuence is harder to discern. Thus, while the Euro-
pean Commission did persuade France to increase bilateral pledges to successive EDFs
(Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p. 116), it did not press meaningfully for an overall rise in
French aid volumes. It follows that the ODA increases that did occur under French Presi-
dents François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac had less to do with the EU than with France’s
geopolitical ambitions and readiness to work towards regime norms such as the UN’s
development assistance target of 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI). The EU
also did little to encourage France to improve its aid quality, taken here to refer to
untying (the delinking of development assistance from exports) and aid concessionality
(the grant-element of ODA). Once again, the fact that improvements did take place in
aid quality – France untied 45.3 per cent of ODA 1988 compared to 38.5 per cent in
1974–75, while also stabilising the grant level of its ODA at around 90 per cent over this
same period – should be attributed less to EU demands than to small-scale campaigns
by French NGOs and peer review pressures from fellow DAC donors (Cumming, 2001).
The EUwasmoreproactive in calling for closer coordinationbetween the Commission and
the MSs. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty introduced guidelines on the 3Cs (coordination, com-
plementarity and coherence) and stipulated, in Article 130x, that ‘the Community and the
Member States shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation’. In response,
France could point to priorities, such as Africa, infrastructure and rural development, which
it shared with the Commission. In reality, however, these had been French priorities long
before the EU adopted them, and there was little sign that France was about to fall into
line behind the Commission in its ambition to coordinate MS aid policies (Petit, 2013, p. 175).
Overall, the limited impact of Europeanisation must be understood in terms of France’s
dominant inﬂuence in Europe prior to the UK’s accession in 1973. It was after all the French
who appointed every European Development Commissioner until 1984 and who had
‘instigated the entire “development cooperation” element of European policy’ (Frisch,
2013, p. 110) by making the creation of the Association a condition of its membership
of the EU. France’s dominance meant that it had the institutional capacity and technical
expertise not only to resist soft EU pressures and pursue a Gaullist ‘France ﬁrst’ policy
instead (Wong, 2006, p. 205), but also to use the EU as a platform to resist norms
arising out of the World Bank-led aid regime. In the 1960s and 1970s, for example,
French policy-makers legitimised their ad hoc, neo-colonial aid practices in Africa by
observing that Jacques Ferrandi’s pragmatic, intuitive approach to project selection, had
become ‘“the doctrine” of DG VIII’ and offered ‘a way of distancing [the EU’s] action
from that of other donors such as the World Bank, regarded as far too “technocratic”’
(Dimier, 2013, p. 38). In the 1980s, too, French ofﬁcials used the EU’s partnership model,
its support for elements of the New International Economic Order, and its reservations
regarding the Bank’s structural adjustment programmes (Interview with Dieter Frisch,
2011), to bolster France’s stance against the emerging orthodoxy – the pensée unique,
which rejected state-directed development in favour of the market – and justify its contin-
ued subsidisation of the Franc Zone, a protectionist currency-support mechanism, mainly
for ex-French African colonies (Wilson, 1993).
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The new context for Europeanisation
The late 1990s offered a more propitious climate for Europeanisation, thanks to domestic
French reforms, greater EU pressures and the political space opened up by the emerging
aid regime complex. On the domestic front, the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin under-
took the largest ever overhaul of French aid. By 1999, Jospin’s government had merged
the Cooperation Ministry (effectively the Ministry for Francophone Africa) into the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs (MFA), transferred lead responsibility for aid to a more professional
agency, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), and drawn a line under
France’s much-criticised neo-colonial aid practices, linked to FrançAfrique (Meimon,
2007). In so doing, Jospin was not so much Europeanising as normalising French ODA
by aligning it to New Public Management (NPM) principles, which, though not originally
European, were championed by the EU in the 1990s (Rozenberg, 2011).
These reforms pointed to a new awareness that France could no longer tackle single-
handedly the challenges of Africa and that it would need to work increasingly through
the EU, even if that resulted in French policies being ‘at least partially Europeanized’ (Char-
illon &Wong, 2011, p. 19). With French ODA under budgetary pressure from the Maastricht
process, public spending reviews and the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis, there was a growing
recognition that the EU, as a ‘development champion’, was a ‘rational choice’ (Bué, 2011,
p. 85) for France as a declining great power. The EU offered a multiplier effect, since as one
MFA ofﬁcial put it, ‘Where France gives 15 million euros, the EDF gives 300 million’ (Inter-
view, 2014). It was ‘symbolically useful’ too, providing a cover for unpopular collective
actions such as aid sanctions and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs, Europe’s
free trade agreements with different African, Caribbean and Paciﬁc (ACP) regions), a
voice in forums where France was under-represented, and a legitimising force for difﬁcult
domestic cutbacks. In this latter context, the EU’s Code of Conduct on Complementarity
and Division of Labour in development policy helped the French administration to
justify reductions in aid and diplomatic staff (Balleix, 2010).
French policy-makers did, moreover, recognise the need to do more, in an enlarged
Europe to capitalise on their contributions to the EU, which now amount to a quarter of
all French aid (Peyronnet & Cambon, 2012, p. 137). To this end, France prepared White
Papers (e.g. MFA, 2008), commissioned evaluations of, for example, France’s impact on
the 10th EDF (MFA, 2014), and wrote strategy papers, such as the MFA’s 2010 ‘What
should Europe’s policy be on development?’ and its 2011 ‘Framework Document’
(Coopération au Développement: Une Vision Française). This latter document in particular
is viewed by French ofﬁcials as a key source of inspiration behind the EU’s 2012 ‘Agenda
for Change’, with its emphasis on Africa, the Mediterranean and aid differentiation (Inter-
view with AFD ofﬁcials, 2014). The likelihood is that France’s desire to shape EU thinking
will intensify if the EU can – by drawing on its greater size (now 28 member countries), aid
volumes (over 55 per cent of global aid) and development effectiveness (OECD, 2012,
p. 13) – truly establish itself as a norm-setter internationally.
Just as French policy-makers were recognising the need to collaborate more with the
EU, so the EU was increasing its pressures on MSs and ﬁrming up its acquis in terms of
development policy via new Treaties, Commission communications and Council con-
clusions. This acquis can be likened to a ‘European aid regime’, some of whose norms
(e.g. on untying) have their origins in the World Bank/OECD-led regime, while others
EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 5
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(e.g. on policy coherence and support for the EDF) are more distinctively European. It has
been bolstered by the actions of the European Commission as a norm entrepreneur, enga-
ging in ‘purposeful opportunism’ and exercising its ‘right of initiative’ (Bué, 2011, p. 92) in
support of NGOs. Typically, the EU has provided around 60 per cent of ofﬁcial French NGO
funding as well as 50 per cent of the monies received by CONCORD, Europe’s confedera-
tion of national NGO platforms) (CONCORD, 2014). In so doing, it has impacted on devel-
opment politics in France by helping these NGOs hold the government to account on its
European aid commitments. That French NGOs are not opposed to championing the Euro-
pean cause is perhaps not surprising given that the French public has remained supportive
of the European Commission, which is ranked ahead of donor states and private donors in
terms of credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness (Ipsos, 2013, p. 6).4 That French NGOs are
also attached to European ODA is clear from the fact that they planned, in 2014, a cam-
paign to ensure that France did not disengage from the EDF (Interview with Coordination
Sud, 2014). It can equally be inferred from the responsiveness of the French national NGO
platform, Coordination Sud, to requests for information for Delegation Watch (a CONCORD
report monitoring exchanges between EU delegations and CSOs) and the EU’s annual
‘European Development Report’ (Interview with Coordination Sud, 2014).
Finally, the emergence of the aid regime complex has offered new opportunities. This
complex has materialised due to a rebalancing of the global economy in favour of emer-
ging countries as well as a growing donor recognition of both the challenges posed by
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the need to go beyond aid. This blurring
of the distinction between ODA and ‘ODA plus’ and between OECD and non-OECD
donors has weakened the original focal point for aid, speciﬁcally the World Bank
(Cumming, 2001). It has, equally, created space for other actors like NGOs, many of
which have been pushing for norms similar to those enshrined within the EU develop-
ment acquis, and, crucially, the EU itself, which has endeavoured to embed itself
better within, and make its presence felt across, the complex. Yet while the EU has
sought to carve out a norm-setter role internationally – the 2005 European Consensus
on Development, for example, was supposed to offer an alternative to the Washington
Consensus with its emphasis on ‘more and better aid’ (Carbone, 2013, p. 487) – it has
had to invest so much energy into coordinating its approach that it has been unable
to shape most international aid debates or challenge the neoliberal paradigm (Farrell,
2008, p. 235). Indeed, the EU has, in establishing its presence within international organ-
isations, ended up embracing some neoliberal orthodoxies: its advocacy of EPAs and its
alignment to World Bank thinking on governance are illustrative in this regard (Arts &
Dickson, 2004). The fact that the EU has become more supportive of neoliberal meta-
norms has inevitably increased the reputational costs to France of norm defection as
well as making it harder for it to use the EU to justify a strand of French development
policy (e.g. on food sovereignty and commodity price stabilisation) that ﬁts uncomforta-
bly with free-market thinking.
Adapting to or ‘complexifying’ Europeanisation?
In light of this ‘new season’ of European pressures (Carbone, 2008a) and of the overhaul of
EU institutions and instruments that took place in the 2000s (Orbie, 2012), it seems reason-
able to expect France’s aid polity and policies to have adapted to these new realities.
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On the institutional front, the biggest change has been the rise of France’s develop-
ment agency/bank, the AFD, which has seen a 35 per cent increase in personnel and a ﬁve-
fold increase in activities over the past decade (OECD, 2013, pp. 17, 64). The AFD’s
ascendancy has been facilitated by the EU, which has accredited it, after a ‘rigorous six-
pillar assessment process in 2007’, as a channel for disbursing funds delegated by the
European Commission (Interview in Brussels, 2014). Other institutional adaptations
include the opening of an AFD ofﬁce in Brussels in 2002. Also in 2002, the MFA provided
a development counsellor in support of its existing Africa counsellor (Balleix, 2010, p. 98).
In addition, the MFA and AFD both second national experts: while these postings are
intended to help upload French preferences to the EU, they nonetheless expose French
policy-makers to the EU’s dense policy-making environment, which has had ‘a socialising
effect, particularly on younger, open-minded French ofﬁcials’ (Interview in Brussels, 2014).
That aside, it would be wrong to overstate the impact of Europeanisation on France’s
aid polity. Arguably, the rise of the AFD is better explained in terms of French domestic
variables (such as the MFA’s failure to control its budget in 2002 (Meimon, 2007, p. 46))
and international factors (such as the rise of NPM theories, which had been espoused
by the World Bank and were then brought back to France by Jean-Michel Severino, an out-
going World Bank Vice-President (1997–2000) and the incoming Head of the AFD (2001–
10) (Interview with AFD, 2014). Ultimately too, the scale of France’s institutional change
has remained limited, with little ‘convergence towards a common [European] institutional
model’ (Harmsen, 1999, p. 82), no closures of overseas missions in favour of the EU, and
few changes to the SGCI, now relabelled the SGAE (Secrétariat général des affaires eur-
opéennes), which continues to act as a centralising force, restricting the freedom of
manoeuvre of France’s permanent representation in Brussels (Rozenberg, 2011, p. 14).
Size matters
Turning to policy matters, the EU has stepped up pressure on ODA volumes. Thus, the
European Council, at its 2002 Barcelona summit, and subsequently the UN Monterrey Con-
ference, persuaded MSs to commit to spending at least 0.33 per cent of GNI individually on
aid and 0.39 per cent collectively by 2006 (Orbie, 2003). When this latter target was met
before the deadline, MSs pledged in 2005 to reach 0.56 per cent by 2010 and 0.7
per cent by 2015, with half of the increase going to Africa (Carbone, 2007). These pressures
have come on top of longstanding EU calls for France to maintain its contributions to the
EDF and recent requests, via the open method of coordination, for voluntary contributions
to regional trust funds. France has taken these targets seriously, even if it adopted a low-
proﬁle during negotiations on the ‘Monterrey agenda’ (Orbie, 2003; Carbone, 2007). Thus,
French aid rose from USD 5.3 billion or 0.32 per cent of GNI in 2001 to USD 10.6 billion or
0.47 per cent in 2006. With USD 12.9 billion or 0.50 per cent of GNI in 2010, France came
close to the interim objective of 0.51 per cent. France has, not unexpectedly, done better
on its commitments to Africa, doubling ODA to the continent between 2000 and 2009
(OECD, 2013). Unsurprisingly too, France has continued to contribute heavily to EU
efforts, increasing the share of its aid through the EU from 10.5 per cent in 2002 to 23.1
per cent in 2008 (Balleix, 2010, p. 95).
That said, it would be misleading to link rises in French ODA too closely to EU pressures.
In fact, French ofﬁcials have ‘not felt under any particular pressure from the EU’ (Interview
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in Brussels, 2014), which has only recently added its voice to longstanding demands from
the UN, the DAC, and French civil society. Furthermore, rising ODA trends began as early as
2000, and a number of European non-EU (e.g. Switzerland) and non-European countries
(like the USA and Japan) have raised their aid budgets over this same period (OECD,
various years). Crucially too, France has not performed well on some targets. French
ODA fell to 0.46 per cent in 2011–12 and is only set to reach 0.48 per cent in 2015
(OECD, 2013, p. 48). The French contribution to the EDF has, moreover, decreased from
24.3 per cent (EDF 9) to 17.5 per cent (EDF 11), which reﬂects a fall in real terms, given
that the current EDF is over seven not six years and includes more contributors (Interview
with MFA, 2014). In addition, France is calling for a move away from bilateral pledges to the
EDF and towards the budgetisation of aid to the ACP, with a view to repatriating 2 per cent
of its current contributions and narrowing the gap between its voluntary EDF and ﬁxed
Community budget contributions (Peyronnet & Cambon, 2012, p. 154).
The fact that France has been so far off the 0.7 per cent aid target has been brushed
aside by the French government, which has simply promised to resume its efforts after
the recession (OECD, 2013). However, behind the scenes, France has endeavoured to
camouﬂage this failure by ‘complexifying’ this normative aid target. It has, in other
words, refracted it through the prism of regime complexity, using strategies such as
norm-stretching, forum shopping/creation and regime-shifting. While norm-stretching is
not unusual in donor circles, France is the second worst European culprit (after Austria)
in terms of inﬂating its aid ﬁgures, with 50 per cent of French ODA consisting of non-
aid items (Hayes, 2007). An example of forum shopping/creation is France’s establishment
of the permanent secretariat to the Leading Group on Innovative Financing within the
G20. In creating this grouping, France has diverted attention away from its poor record
on aid volumes and towards its creative solutions for going beyond aid ﬁnancing,
through its airline ticket tax to fund UNITAID, and its promotion of a development-friendly
European Financial Transactions Tax.
Finally, France has attempted to regime-shift by altering the basis on which ODA ﬁgures
are calculated. AFD Director Jean-Michel Severino has been central to these efforts,
arguing within the DAC and in inﬂuential publications (Severino & Ray, 2011) that
donors should abandon arbitrary targets based on ODA (against which France is perform-
ing badly) and embrace a more eclectic measure of concessional ﬂows to developing
countries (against which France is performing well) that includes migrant remittances,
innovative ﬁnancing and expenditure on global public goods.
Quality counts
Aid quality is another area where the EU has sought to exert inﬂuence. The EU has, since
2001, been at ‘the centre of the debates on untying of aid’ and pushed, albeit unsuccess-
fully, for the untying of food aid and technical assistance (Carbone, 2014, p. 108). Equally,
the European Commission has long been a leading exponent of higher levels of aid con-
cessionality. In 2005, the European Consensus on Development stressed that the ‘majority
of Community aid will continue to be provided in the form of grants, which is particularly
suitable for the poorest countries’.
France has not been oblivious to these pressures. It was, in fact, persuaded by the Euro-
pean Commission to drop its reservations to the 2001 DAC Recommendation on untying
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of aid in exchange for a commitment on burden-sharing by donors that were allocating
less aid to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (Financial Times, 23 June 2000). France has
fulﬁlled its commitments on ODA untying given at the 2008 Accra High Level Forum on
aid effectiveness: 95 per cent of French bilateral assistance was untied in 2010, compared
to 85 per cent in 2008, while, in 2009 and 2010, almost 100 per cent of French ODA to LDCs
was untied (OECD, 2013). While France’s record on concessionality has been poorer, it has
nonetheless targeted its shrinking grant-aid on poor countries, particularly the 17 priority
recipients, mainly in francophone Africa, identiﬁed in the MFA’s 2011 ‘Framework Docu-
ment on Development Cooperation’.
That said, it would be wrong to link France’s performance on aid quality too closely to
European pressures. In fact, the trend towards enhanced quality is a longstanding one and
applies to countries outside the EU, as the total proportion of OECD formally untied aid has
risen from 40 per cent in 2000 to 76 per cent in 2010 (Carbone, 2014, p. 105). Furthermore,
the key driver on quality has been the DAC, whose Secretariat secured the 2001 DAC Rec-
ommendation on untying of aid and established conventions for monitoring the grant-
element of aid (Carbone, 2014 , p. 105). Equally, domestic pressure groups such as the
Observatoire Permanent de la Coopération Française have campaigned in favour of
untying, while, France’s audit commission, the Cour des Comptes (2012), has criticised
recent increases in loans relative to grants. Signiﬁcantly too, France’s actual performance
on aid quality has remained patchy. To illustrate, Paris has continued to engage in informal
tying: by seconding ofﬁcials to ministries in recipient countries where they can inﬂuence
contract selection; by hardening ‘social and environmental norms regulating the allocation
of AFD-ﬁnanced tenders in Africa’ (with a view to discouraging Chinese competition); and
by incrementally moving contracts away from infrastructure projects towards sectors, like
water sanitation, where French companies are competitive (Darracq, undated, p. 28). More
worryingly, France’s performance on aid concessionality has slumped. In 2010, Paris failed
to comply with the OECD’s minimum grant requirement and, in 2011, provided a lower
share of ODA (86.2 per cent) in grant form than any other DAC donor (OECD, 2013, p. 114).
To understand France’s approach, reference is required to regime complexity. Thus, in
the case of aid tying, French policy-makers have engaged in a limited form of forum shop-
ping. They have taken stock of radically different approaches to untying in other parts of
the regime complex, particularly in the emerging powers, which are pro-tying, but also in
the EU’s new MSs and DAC donors such as Japan and the USA, which are untying laggards.
Emboldened by the lack of stickiness of this norm, French politicians, such as Foreign Min-
ister Laurent Fabius, have insisted that aid should beneﬁt French companies more, whilst
stopping short of demanding a return to tying (OECD, 2013, p. 26).
Turning to concessionality, here French ofﬁcials have gone further and sought to
replace an established EU norm, whereby grant-aid is the preferred modality for most
developing countries, with a new norm, blending, which involves various combinations
of grants and loans. Drawing upon its legal and technical expertise, particularly its experi-
ence over the last sixty years as a development bank, the AFD has, with strong support
from the German development agency KFW and the European Investment Bank (EIB), con-
structed a cogent case for blending, arguing that loans are quicker, better at encouraging
self-reliance, and larger than grants. France has in the process ‘evangelised’ the EU and
ensured a ‘silent revolution’ (Interview in Brussels, 2014), whereby the European Commis-
sion, anxious to mobilise larger ﬁnancial ﬂows in support of the MDGs, has now embraced
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this ‘radically different modality’, channelling 2 billion of its 56 billion euro budget to
blending projects and opening up national as well as regional indicative programme
monies for these operations (Interview with AFD, 2014). French policy-makers have, more-
over, sought to render permanent this normative shift by helping to create new forums,
speciﬁcally a Blending Platform, a Mutual Reliance Initiative to ﬁnance blending, and
regional funds – including the Africa–EU Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF), established in
2007 – that combine EU grants with private sector investment.
Coherence
Another area where the EU has sought to shape MS programmes has been coherence. It
has promoted both horizontal coherence (involving synergies between two or more
development-related policies) and vertical coherence (involving interactions between
the EU’s supranational level and MSs). The EU launched its policy coherence for develop-
ment (PCD) agenda in 2005, establishing speciﬁc commitments in 12 inter-related policy
areas and creating an inter-service group on PCD. Other measures included the Code of
Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in 2007, a related Fast-Track initiative
in 2008, and joint programming in 2012. This latter process stipulates that only three
donors should operate in any particular sector of a recipient country and that donors
should not participate in more than ﬁve sectors. It has been piloted in ﬁve countries,
with plans being taken forward in another 40 (European Commission, 2014, p. 7).
France has been receptive to these pressures, making PCD part of the French develop-
ment minister’s brief and promoting synergies between development and other policies.
France has, for example, pushed hard within the EU, for climate change concerns to be
better integrated into development policies (Interview with MFA, 2014). It has, moreover,
championed food security within the G20 and worked hard to bolster the capacity of
developing countries to meet the food standards governing access to European
markets (Assemblée Nationale, 2014). Equally, France has, in its 2011 Framework Docu-
ment, identiﬁed priority sectors for PCD that are almost identical to those selected by
the European Council in November 2009 (Assemblée Nationale, 2014).5 On the procedural
front, too, France has submitted itself to a European Commission-led process aimed at
ensuring mutual recognition of procedures across the ‘development banks’ that act as
channels for Commission funds, speciﬁcally the AFD, KFW and EIB (Interview with AFD,
2014). In addition, France has signed up to the EU Code of Conduct, the Fast-Track initiat-
ive, and joint programming. The French government has, moreover, expressed its readi-
ness to replace its own ‘Documents Cadre de Partenariat’ with European Country
Strategy Papers, although the MFA seems more inclined than the AFD to go down this
route (Interviews with senior MFA and AFD ofﬁcials, 2014).
Even so, it would be wrong to attribute these developments in French ODA entirely to
EU pressures. Some changes are the result of domestic budgetary pressures arising out of
the 2007 General Review of Public Policy (Balleix, 2010, p. 98), while others may be better
explained in terms of the work of the OECD’s high-level aid effectiveness forums in Paris,
Accra and Busan. The key actor in charge of France’s strategy on PCD, the development
minister, has lacked commitment, while France has failed to establish its own permanent
structure with a mandate to promote and monitor PCD across the 11 French ministries
involved in development cooperation (OECD, 2013). In addition, France’s own
10 G. D. CUMMING
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
7:0
9 0
6 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
development coordination mechanisms have remained weak: the Comité Interministériel
de Développement International et Coopération, an inter-ministerial aid committee estab-
lished in 1998, only met twice between 2006 and 2012 (Senate, 2012), while the Confér-
ence d’Orientation Stratégique et de Programmation, a broad-based planning group
formed in 2004, has since been disbanded. It is hardly surprising therefore that ‘in practice,
the choices made in co-ordination forums do not always favour development’ (OECD,
2008, p. 33).
It is also not surprising that France’s willingness to align to EU procedures has often
been highly conditional. Indeed, France is said to have been instrumental in ensuring
that the Code of Conduct had no binding legal force, leaving MSs free to evaluate their
added value themselves, and making the division of labour among European donors
subject to the principle of reciprocity in the case of withdrawal from countries or
sectors (Balleix, 2010, p. 102). A similar reticence is likely to mark France’s approach to
joint programming, once it is required to enter into ‘delegated cooperation’, or to with-
draw from a sector, particularly if French interests are threatened. French ofﬁcials are
already anticipating problems with synchronising project cycles and with resistance
from recipient countries concerned about reductions in ODA (Interview with MFA,
2014). They are also anxious about the exclusion of MSs from the initial programming
stage, when priority sectors are agreed between EU delegations and partner countries,
and are alert to the danger that, due to competitive bidding procedures, joint program-
ming could allow non-EU actors like the World Bank (often likened to ‘a steam-roller’) to
become lead donors (Interview in Brussels, 2014).
France’s limited compliance with PCD should not be astonishing given that the agenda
has been aptly described by Carbone (2008b) as ‘mission impossible’. It could nonetheless
be argued that the French have reduced PCD’s chances of success even further through
norm-stretching. Thus, in 2006, French policy-makers were instrumental in pushing a
broad conception of coherence, aimed at classing twelve political sectors as coherent
with development policy (Balleix, 2010). In doing so, however, they not only made the
task of PCD even more Herculean but also diverted attention from issues like trade and
agriculture, which were at the core of this agenda but on which France and the EU
were vulnerable to attack due to their support for the EU’s potentially damaging farm sub-
sidies (Balleix, 2010). A less subversive example of norm-shifting involves the formation of
the African Peace Facility in 2003. This instrument for ﬁnancing security-related action
within the EDF framework was set up with strong backing from France and Britain (Inter-
view with UK Ministry of Defence, 2011). Its establishment was, however only made poss-
ible by shifting a long-established norm whereby EDF monies cannot be used in a military
capacity.
Regime complexity and obstacles to Europeanisation
It follows from the above that French policy-makers have been adept at resisting or
reframing Europeanisation, particularly where it is considered not to be in the national
interest. They have been alert to the fact that the EU is moving closer to neoliberal organ-
isations like the World Bank and that successive European enlargements have brought in
MSs that do not share French aid priorities and, in the case of the ‘Nordic Plus’ (the Nordics,
Ireland and Britain), actually coordinate their positions ahead of EU meetings (Arts, 2004,
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pp. 103–104). In order to avoid the adjustment costs associated with ‘Anglo-Nordic’ forms
of Europeanisation, some French decision-makers have drawn upon France’s continued
inﬂuence within Europe, whether through its 200-strong mission in Brussels, its ranking
as the second largest contributor to the EDF and its blocking minority on the Committee
on Development Cooperation (CODEV) with Germany (European Report, 23 February
2005). These veto players include diplomatic posts, whose stafﬁng levels are threatened
by European initiatives such as the Code of Conduct, and which are concerned about the
reduced visibility of France’s bilateral programme (Interview with MFA, 2014). The AFD is
another veto player which is worried that Europeanisation will encroach on its recently
acquired powers and which ‘advocates a more [… ] pragmatic approach, respecting
the added-value of the various European players involved in development’ (Balleix,
2010, p. 104). Similar concerns have been voiced by French Parliamentarians, who are
concerned that insufﬁcient European aid is being allocated to francophone Africa, that
too much is going to Chinese contractors, and that the European Commission is
demanding higher MS contributions despite doing a poor job of coordination and per-
sistently underspending its commitments (Interview with French Parliamentary Rappor-
teur, 2014).
Another way in which French policy-makers have skirted around Europeanisation has
been by taking advantage of the non-binding nature of EU socialisation pressures in
this area of shared EU/MS competence. The fact is that the European Commission has
‘no clear strategy to promote socialization’ (Lightfoot & Szent-Ivanyi, 2014, p. 2) and is
rarely considered an authority on aid matters: the EU is not invited to address the AFD
after the publication of its annual report whereas the World Bank is (Interview with
AFD, 2014). The Commission has, moreover, failed to mobilise sufﬁciently the energies
of French NGOs, many of which continue to follow their own ‘militant’ agenda and
are too small to access substantial European funding (Interview with Coordination Sud,
2014).
A ﬁnal factor that has encouraged and enabled France to reframe Europeanisation
has been the aid regime complex. The fact that this complex now includes such a
diverse array of actors and norms has increased the transaction costs associated with
adhering to some EU pressures. To illustrate, France can no longer undertake further
untying safe in the knowledge that other donors will follow suit. Instead, such a step
will expose it to increased competition from emerging donors. The fact that the
complex contains such a proliferation of aid venues has, moreover, increased the
number of focal points around which norms converge and has in the process created
political space, sometimes at the expense of the EU, for ‘new’ and more established
actors. The former include emerging donors, which have risen to prominence through
OECD High-Level forums, where alternatives to the Western development model are
now given recognition, and through the G20, whose focus on ‘realist politics’ works
against ‘the kind of multilateral norm-based governance approach favoured by the
EU’ (Farrell, 2012, p. 242). As to more established powers, France has been among
those to beneﬁt from regime complexity. As a leading, well represented donor with
its own development vision, France has been well placed to engage in regime-related
strategies. It has, for example, forum-shopped outside the EU, initiating the ﬁrst G20
development ministerial meeting in 2011 and using this venue to push food security
and combat agricultural price volatility (OECD, 2013). France has also forum-shopped,
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norm-stretched and regime-shifted within the EU, where it has drawn on its agenda-
setting powers (notably during French Presidencies), its chairing of the EDF Committee,
its activism within weekly CODEV meetings and its linkages to Mediterranean donors
within ‘Club Med’ (Bué, 2011, p. 93).
Conclusion
This article began by noting how difﬁcult it is to isolate the ‘net EU impact’ (Levi-Faur,
2004) and by suggesting that regime complexity might provide a useful tool for nuancing
claims about Europeanisation, with reference speciﬁcally to French ODA. It has shown how
France’s aid polity and policies underwent only limited Europeanisation over the early
decades of European integration and attributed this to France’s dominance within
Europe and its ability to use the EU as a platform to avoid neoliberal norms emerging
across the World Bank-led aid regime.
The late 1990s provided a more propitious climate for Europeanisation with the Jospin
reforms, the Commission’s norm entrepreneurship and the emergent aid regime complex.
The fact that the EU’s efforts to embed itself within this complex were coupled with its
greater support for neoliberal development orthodoxies, has made it harder for France to
defect from EU-backed norms on aid quantity, quality and coherence. While France has
responded positively to some EU pressures, notably on PCD, it has generally sought to
limit the impact of Europeanisation, with the help of veto players and of the ambiguities
created by an aid complex, which has increased the transaction costs of norm compliance,
while allowing more wriggle-room for emerging powers and established donors like France.
These ﬁndings suggest that, on balance, regime complexity favours great powers,
making it easier for them to ‘complexify’ norms and avoid compliance. This conclusion
begs two further questions: how signiﬁcant is the French case and how useful is regime
complexity as a conceptual tool? While France has clearly retained elements of a hard
case, resisting and reframing top-down Europeanisation of its bilateral assistance pro-
gramme, it has also become a more representative, even a prototypical case, as
France’s use of regime-related strategies to resist Europeanisation is likely to be replicated
elsewhere in the EU. Against a backdrop of growing Euroscepticism and continued reces-
sion, France is not the only EU MS to be wary of Europeanisation. Many new MSs are reluc-
tant European donors with little interest in development (Lightfoot & Szent-Ivanyi, 2014).
Conversely, the UK is a ‘good student of development’ but views Europeanisation as a
process that lowers aid standards (Bué, 2011, p. 94). Following a similar logic, Scandinavian
MSs have been ‘the most reluctant’ to engage in EU initiatives on division of labour, or to
participate in EU projects, such as the AITF (Orbie, 2012, p. 27).
Turning ﬁnally to the value of regime complexity, this clearly has its limitations in that it
adds another layer of complexity to a process, Europeanisation, that is already multi-
faceted. That said, assuming it is combined with thick description and rigorous interviews,
this framework should help to ﬁnegrain analyses and identify instances where Europeani-
sation has been a key driver of policy change. It follows that regime complexity should be
used to explore the impact of EU pressures on other MS aid programmes and on related
issues such as innovative ﬁnancing, trade preferences and concessional lending. It is only
in this way that the EU’s true place in the global jigsaw of aid norms, strategies and forums
can be properly understood.
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Notes
1. One exception is Hofmann’s (2009) study of European security.
2. Parallel regimes, where there is no overlap, differ from overlapping regimes, where multiple insti-
tutions have authority over an issue, and nested regimes, where institutions are embedded
within each other.
3. ‘EC’ and ‘EU’ refer, respectively, to the pre- and post-Maastricht years. The abbreviation ‘EU’
is used throughout this article.
4. Support did nonetheless wane in the late 1990s when the Santer Commission resigned amidst
aid scandals involving, among others, France’s Commissioner Edith Cresson.
5. France chose trade, immigration, investment and ﬁnance, climate change, food security, and
social protection, while the EU highlighted trade and ﬁnance, climate change, food security,
migration and security.
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